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"Because Your Yard is Too Big": SQUATTER STRUGGLES,
THE LOCAL STATE AND DUAL POWER IN UITENHAGE, 1985-1986
"I will build my shack right in the back yard of the
white man's house. And when he wakes up the next
morning and asks why I have built a shack in his yard,
I'll say: 'Because your yard is too big.'" - Langa
Resident
INTRODUCTION
By focussing largely on the struggle Langa's squatters waged against
forced removal, this chapter will attempt to analyse the complex
interactions between local township administrators, the white
establishment, employers, community organisations and trade unions.
To understand this complexity, the romantic conception of
unstratified communities united against a monolithinc state needs to
be jettisoned. Instead, the internal workings of both the social
movements and state apparatuses must be studied. This cannot be
achieved, however, without taking into account the impact social
movements have on the state and how the actions of state officials
affect the strategies of social movements. Furthermore, this
relationship does not exist outside the influence employer interests
exert on the local state and the way this influence is mediated by
trade union pressure.
As this chapter will show, once the object of study is extended in
this way, social processes come to light that call into question two
teleologies. The first is the optimistic view that social movements
are only important to the extent that they contribute to the
build-up of a national movement that will, at some moment in the
future, detonate the collapse of the state. The second is the
pessimistic view that social movements only win those concessions
that structural conditions allow ruling class interests to concede
(1). In both cases, the impact of local movements and how they
determine the terms of social organisation is ignored. For the
former, the structure of society will only be transformed when the
moment of revolution arrives and not before. As far as the latter is
concerned, any changes that do take place, occur on terms determined
almost entirely by the ruling class.
The struggle of Langa's squatters helps demonstrate that gains can
be won through struggle prior to the moment of fundamental change
and that these concessions are not necessarily congruent with what
the dominant classes aimed to achieve.
Langa was a township of about 1000 houses and 6000 shacks. It used
to be adjacent to Uitenhage's central business district and
contained about 50 000 residents. Although designated for removal in
terms of the Group Areas Act since the 1950s, and despite forced
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removals in the 1960s and 1970s, Langa survived. This is the story
of its last stand before being finally wiped out in July-August
To anticipate the argument, there were in fact five aspects of
Langa's pattern and form of political mobilisation and organisation
that determined its impact on the state. Firstly, and most
importantly from a symbolic point of view, there was the Langa
Massacre. This generated enough national and international attention
to prompt the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. Secondly,
Langa had become one of the most organised working class communities
in the Eastern Cape. Thirdly, Langa's squatters had begun to
construct their shacks in a way that made police patrols
impossible, thus effectively rendering parts of the community, in
the words of a local policeman, "uncontrollable". Fourthly, the
community leaders were prepared to enter the risky area of
negotiations. Finally, by forging unity within the working class
between community organisations, youth movementes and trade unions,
and then using this to force business to support key community
demands, the Langa community signficantly increased pressure on
the state to address its grievances.
The power mobilised by the social movement was enhanced by tensions
within and between the state apparatuses and employer organisations.
The collapse of the council, trade union and international pressure
on Volkswagen, rightwing political tendencies in the white community
and tensions between local and central state representatives and
between these and the security forces, all played themselves out in
ways that initially gave the social movement space to win some key
victories. However, as the next chapter will show, these forces
eventually lined up behind a coercive option after the declaration
of the 1986 State of Emergency that led to the decimation of the
social movement.
FROM MOBILISATION TO MASS ORGANISATION
The massacre, the revenge on Kinikini and rising levels of conflict
between the community and security forces in Langa, transformed
popular consciousness. As thousands flocked to join community
organisations, the activists had to find new creative ways of
coping with a mass base in the context of heightened repression.
The most significant feature of the post-massacre period is the
rapid mobilisation and organisation of different constituencies; a
process which was uneven, frequently undirected and often
contradictory. It was this process that transformed daily life in
Uitenhage's townships as schools, factories, community halls,
shebeens and shacks all became abodes for the relentless struggle
for control and power. Weza Made described the atmosphere when he
said:
"Uitenhage is the Ovambo of the Eastern Cape. What you hear
about Ovambo, its happening in'Uitenhage. Brutal killing of
people, kidnappings, disappearances, lot of things." (2)
-2-
Throughout 1985 and into 1986, resistance of one form or another
disrupted schools and factories. (These workplace and educational
struggles will not be discussed here because community struggles are
the focus of this paper.)
The so-called "youth" were the most potent force to emerge from the
battles of township resistance during 1984-86 (3). In Uitenhage the
"youth" became important in a number of roles, i.e. defense,
door-to-door organisation, ideological direction and crime control.
Although the details of youth organisation will be dealt with in a
later section, it is necessary at this stage to unpack the rather
amorphous meaning of the word "youth". In general, the "youth" in
township political culture refers roughly to a political generation
that lies somewhere between the school pupils and employed workers.
There are, however, important overlaps. In the Uitenhage area, those
who constituted the "youth" can be divided into roughly 3
categories. The leadership of the youth congress came essentially
from a farely well educated group of young workers, unemployed young
men and students. It was largely male and most were in their
mid-1920s. This group had a remarkably clear political ideology
derived from a reading of the alternative media, banned literature
(usually ANC material) and some well used Marxist texts (especially
Lenin) published by Progress and Lawrence and Wishart. Other
influences included regional or national gatherings, workshops and
discussions with leaders or old timers from the 1950s. Many of these
people remember 1976 and the leaders of that period as important
early political experiences.
There was a relatively small group of young employed workers who
were less politically articulate and probably the least significant
component of the "youth" constituency. Although this group overlaps
in obvious ways with the formal employed working class constituency,
it did nevertheless constitute an important grouping active in both
youth congress and trade union activities. As such, it helped bridge
differences later on.
From the perspective of shear numbers, the most important component
of the "youth" were the largely uneducated unemployed. These people
were the product of prolonged school boycotts that had forced them
out onto the streets, age limit restrictions and structural
unemployment. Exacerbating this was the fact that because there were
no schools in Langa for africans, it was frequently too expensive
for the poorest parents to afford the busfares pupils required to
travel to Kwanobuhle. All these pressures produced desperate young
men who lived on the fringes of legality and who soon found a home
in the social movements as political tensions rose. Their ages
ranged from between twelve and twenty-five, although most were
teenagers. A large number came from extremely poor families who
lived in shacks and whose main breadwinner would invariably be
unemployed. Interestingly, some of the more renowned members of this
group came from families who had strong rural links and still
displayed traditional dress and make-up, such as ocre-painted faces
and headdresses. Some of the men dressed up as women.
Out of this lumpenproletariat came essentially two types of
political actors. The one was the person who had for some time been
a petty criminal and came into the social movements largely because
by adopting an anti-state resistance ideology he could legitimise
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his illegal activities by defining them as being in the interests a
social good. Their anti-social sub-culture and predisposition to use
violence to give effect to policy decisions existed uncomfortably
alongside the social and communal morality that imbued the ideology
of national resistance and their own desire to be re-absorbed into
the community. However, there were elements who were products of the
schools movement rather than lumpen groups and they joined the youth
movement because they were disillusioned with non-violence. It is
essential to note that the youth congress leadership and the UDF
affiliates in general had very little control over these so-called
"amabutho" groups (4).
Finally, there was the constituency loosely referred to in township
political jargon as "the residents". Obviously this group also
overlaps with the employed working class and "youth" constituencies,
but given an unemployment rate of at least 56% - a figure that is
usually based on records of job seekers (5) - there was obviously a
sizeable proportion of family heads who were unemployed (6). The
residents of Langa, then, were those employed and unemployed working
class people who were responsible for the erection and running of
the household, most of which were shacks. White opposition to the
existence and spread of Langa soon mobilised the residents in
tightly structured organisations aimed at "protecting the
community".
After the massacre, community organisations experienced a huge
inflow of members and for the first time, mass-based grassroots
structures were established. Two interlinked forms of organisation
emerged. To represent specific constituencies, there were a range
of constituency-based organisations. These included UYCO, Uitenhage
Womens Organisation (UWO), Uitenhage Students Congress (USCO),
Uitenhage Parents Crisis Committee, Uitenhage Traders Association,
Consumer Boycott Committee and trade unions. In January 1986 the
Uitenhage Residents Civic Organisation (URECO) was formed
specifically to take up "civic" issues, a function that UYCO had
been fulfilling up until then. Alongside the constituency-based
structures, locality-based multi-constituency structures emerged,
namely the street and area committees. Although these were started
as early as 1984 by people who simply needed to coordinate social
functions in an unregulated unserviced commuhnity, by the end of
1985 they had been politicised and became the bedrock of a tight
well organised resistance network. Nearly all Langa's streets had
street committees which in turn elected representatives to five area
committees. Whereas the actual membership of the street committees
varied in size, the area committees stabilised at about ten members
each (more on this later).
The first community-based campaign that was mounted after the
massacre was the consumer boycott. Although originating from within
the youth congress, the initial boycotts gained support. Uitenhage
experienced more consumer boycotts than any other town during the
1985-86 period. Consumer boycotts were called for the following
periods:
* April-July 1985;
* late July - 27th September 1985;
* 11th October - 14th December 1985;
* 1st January 1986 - 10th March 1986;
-4-
* June 1986 - 4th January 1987
Four out of five boycotts were triggered by a decisive state action
that directly affected the community: the first was a response to
the massacre, the second followed the declaration of the 1985 State
of Emergency, the third was called three days after eviction notices
were handed out to 426 squatter households and the fifth was
announced after the 1986 State of Emergency was declared.
The consumer boycott demands can be divided into local and national
ones. The local ones were: students be allowed to form SRCs;
reinstatement of dismissed workers at Volkswagen; upgrade rather
than removal of Langa. The national demands were release of
detainees; unbanning of UDF meetings; withdrawal of troops; killers
of CRADOCK leaders be charged (added in July); leaders must not be
killed, kidnapped or harassed.
Unlike the Port Elizabeth boycott, the Uitenahage boycott was not
nearly as successful, nor did it have as dramatic an impact. There
were four reasons for this: firstly, unlike most Eastern Cape towns,
Uitenhage's african community is located in two townships to the
north and south of the white town. This made it difficult to
organise a united and synchronised response from the two communities
because each faced very different problems related to the fact that
in Langa people were poorer, black shops with appropriate goods were
less available, the imperatives of the anti-removal struggle often
conflicted with those of the largely Kwanobuhle led consumer
boycott, and anatagonisms between the youth and residents often
produced a reaction against the boycott. Secondly, the trade unions
never threw their full weight behind the boycotts. Thirdly, the
consumer boycotts dragged on for too long without any meaningful
concessions being won. Fourthly, Uitenhage did not have a local
Chamber of Commerce imbued with the same liberal ideological bias
that Tony Gilson and his colleagues gave the Port Elizabeth Chamber
of Commerce.
To emphasise the role of the youth in the boycotts, it must be
pointed out the militaristic sub-culture of the amabutho militated
against the successful implementation of this strategy. Shaped by
the dynamic of ongoing street battles with the security forces, the
consciousness of the amabutho was not sensitive enough to the
complex task of organisation, persuasion and tactical
decision-making. Furthermore, smouldering power struggles between
the UDF and trade union leaderships, created considerable tensions
between amabutho groups and NAAWU workers. It was these tensions
between the unemployed, unionised workes and residents that undercut
the consumer boycott.
The rest of this chapter will show that it was the struggle over
the terms of reproduction of the labour force rather than
consumption or production struggles that was to facilitate the
building of working class unity in Uitenhage. There is little truth
in Glenn Adler's callous generalisation that in Uitenhage "working
class responses to worsening social and economic conditions were at
best completely uncoordinated during 1985, or at worst in direct
conflict." (7)
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WHITE FEARS VERSUS SQUATTER RESISTANCE
The squatter's struggle against removal began in earnest in May
after 350 white ratepayers signed a petition drafted by the deputy
Mayor, Mr. Bokkie Human, handed to the deputy Minister of
Cooperation and Development, Dr. G de V Morrison. It called for the
removal of Langa's squatters. Refuting press reports that East Cape
Administration Board (ECAB) was planning the removal, the Director,
Louis Koch, quickly pointed out that Langa fell under the
jurisdiction of the Kwanobuhle Town Council (KTC) and that ECAB's
only function is the technical provision of housing and
infrastructure (8).
By this stage, however, KTC was not only defunct because the Council
had resigned, but also because an Administrator had yet yet to be
appointed. This bureaucratic confusion within the state was a
crucial moment for the Langa community because it meant there was no
coherent or capable authority that could respond immediately and
with sufficient force to implement the demands of the white
community. Nor was there sufficient agreement on the issue between
the local NP MP and the Uitenhage municipality over how to deal
with the issue (9). There is very little likelihood that Langa's
community organisations could have instigated united resistance
against removal if the state had acted immediately, coherently and
with sufficient force. In the event, bureaucratic confusion meant
there was sufficient time and space for the community organisations
to organise a response and develop appropriate organisational forms.
Soon after the press carried reports of the white petition, a
meeting of 1 800 people representing youth, student, women's and
community organisations met on Sunday 26th May to discuss the
threatened removal. The meeting called on the KTC to upgrade Langa
and rejected the proposed removal. It was decided that a delegation
should meet the KTC to inquire about plans to remove Langa. The
delegation comprised youth congress, area committee and trade union
representatives. Its leader was B. Haas (UYCO activist and
chairperson of the coordinating committee of area committees in
Kwanobuhle), and the rest were W. Made (UYCO - Langa), B. Sandi
(area committees), S. Mandabana (MACWUSA), P. Speelman (area
committees), G. Nojilama (area committees) and S. Nxusa (area
committees). Significantly, this delegation excluded FOSATU
unionists and the clergy.
Deftly exploiting the bureacratic confusion in township
administration, the spokesperson for the delegation, Weza Made,
said that "since Mr. Louis Koch made it clear that he was not
responsible for the removals and said that it was the council, we
would like to ask [the ex-mayor] Mr. Tini to clarify that comment."
(EPH, 20.5.85) Made went on to say that the Sunday meeting had
resolved to call on the KTC to upgrade rather than remove Langa, and
to build "decent low-rent houses". According to Made:
"The people decided they will not be able to afford the high
rents in Kwanobuhle. Most of the squatters are unemployed or
on short time. Most people are dependent on pensions and money
paid by their lodgers. The people are aware that living
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conditions in the area are bad in terms of health. But the
people [have] asked the town clerk to develop the area and make
it healthier." (10)
When the press contacted Tini, he referred all questions to the town
clerk claiming he had disassociated himself from the council.
Coetzee, speaking for the KTC, said that he had recieved no requests
from the community to upgrade Langa. He said: "If I recieve such a
request I will evaluate it and discuss it with the Department of
Cooperation and Development. Those concerned may either come and see
me or put their request in writing." Before Langa is removed, he
claimed, a long negotiation process would have to be completed:
"I must first find out what the people want. I'm not going to
force anyone to move." (11)
Coetzee maintained that KTC was doing three things to control
Uitenahage's squatters: firstly, it had already prepared 3 000 sites
in Kwanobuhle but was planning to more than double this number to
cater for Langa1s "6 60 0" squatter families. Secondly, strict
measures were being taken to ensure that no new squatter families
arrived in Langa. Thirdly, illegal residents were being warned to
move out but no-one was being fined or prosecuted. Fourthly, steps
still needed to be taken to "clear" shacks that had been erected on
roads thus barring the path of sanitation and refuse removal
trucks. More to the point, the inability of police and army vehicles
to enter some areas of Langa was even more perturbing for the
authorities (12).
The delegation met the officials on 11 June 1985 at 3.30 in the
Langa offices of the KTC. The officials were J. Coetzee (town
clerk), P. Veldtman (acting deputy secretary), S. Somtsewu
(superindendent of Langa), and R.D. Basson (administration officer).
(Barry Erasmus was not present because he had yet to been
appointed as Administrator.)
The meeting, which lasted an hour and forty minutes, never got much
further than both parties stating their case (13). However, it
started with both parties applauding the fact that such a meeting
had taken place.
Some keys issues were discussed during the course of this meeting.
Firstly, in response to the claim by the delegation that Langa
residents do not want to move because they believe they cannot
afford the rents in Kwanobuhle, the officials spent some time
explaining the affordability advantages of moving to Kwanobuhle.
These included, (a) a built-in R63.81 subsidy per site to be carried
by the government so that service charges could be pegged at R19.90
per month; (b) rentals calculated according to income on a sliding
scale; (c) the right to purchase a house for R6794 plus smaller
costs. As far as the officials were concerned, all employed people
should have been able to afford these rates.
The delegation asked questions about what provision had been made
for unemployed and retrenched workers; why the Kwanobuhle houses are
being used to rehouse Langa residents when there were people in
Kwanobuhle in need of houses; and why the KTC thinks Langa cannot be
upgraded. Coetzee said he supported the idea in principle but gave
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reasons why the upgrading of Langa was practically not possible:
(a) Langa was only big enough for 2000 sites, whereas 8000 were
needed; (b) no funds were available to cover the high costs of
upgrading Langa's infrastructure; (c) there is no adjacent land
into which Langa could expand; (d) in sutu upgrading was
impossible. Nevertheless, Coetzee promised at the end of the meeting
to submit a report to the government.
The importance of the land issue was brought home to the delegation
during the meeting, prompting Made to coin a phrase that he used
often in the months to follow: "The squatter's struggle is a
struggle for land." More importantly, the leaders realised how
seriously the officials took the community's capacity to resist.
Mades1 implicit threat that confrontation and unrest would result
from removal pointed to the only real form of leverage the community
had over the KTC. It is also interesting that many daily grievances
unrelated to the removal were also raised.
Towards the end of the meeting, Coetzee summed up the situation by
saying the committee has to decide which option was in the best
interests of the community: remaining in Langa and bearing the cost
of upgrading it, or moving to Kwanobuhle where sites have already
been prepared at very low cost. The delegation responded by saying
that it has no mandate to make that choice. It is only there to
communicate the demands of the community and intends returning to
discuss the outcome of the meeting with the community.
As far as the delegation was concerned, they were well aware of the
fact that a choice in economic terms had to be made about which
option was in the best interests of the community. However, they
had no way of making such a calculation. They were well aware of the
dangers of either depending on the "expertise" of the officials or
simply rejecting the Kwanobuhle option without offering an
alternative to the community. It was to resolve the above dilemma
-that Made and a few of his comrades decided to seek professional
assistance in Johannesburg.
Through friends, Weza Made and his comrades made contact with
various support groups and pressmen. These groups pledged their
support for Langa's anti-removal struggle and during the coming
months he was to work closely with academics connected to the
Durban-based Built Environment Support Group (BESG), Sue Lund of the
Grahamstown Rural Committee (GRC) and Mono Badela of City Press.
Resulting from discussions with members of these groups, Made
proposed that the community organisations initiate their own
upgrading proposals as an alternative to the removal plans of KTC. A
group of Natal, Johannesburg and Grahamstown academics were
assembled and plans made to travel to Uitenhage in late July to
assess the viability of this suggestion. However, these plans were
aborted when the Emergency was declared.
By June-July, the leadership was faced with a range of related
problems that demanded organisational solutions. These included:
(a) appropriate means of defense against both official repression
and vigilante action; (b) the necessity for finding ways of
re-organising to cope with expanding membership and rising levels of
mobilisation; (c) how extra-state organisations move beyond
reaction and boycott politics to proactive strategies aimed at
resolving the crisis of daily life in the townships, i.e. the role
of negotiations in particular. In other words, the leadership
were searching for a balance between challenging the state,
defending the community against repression and negotiating
with officials to find solutions to local problems. At a national
level, the UDF was faced with similar problems and responded with
the call "Mobilisation to Organisation. Protest to Challenge" (14).
However, the call for "ungovernability" - a popular slogan of the
time - reflected more accurately the nature of popular politics
in mid-1985: rising levels of mobilisation, violent attacks on
councillors and police, collapse of township administration
and spreading consumer boycotts. The declaration of the State of
Emergency in July and the detention of established leaders,
enabled the militant youth and their belief that violence must
be met with violence, to take control of township politics. This
pattern repeated itself in particularly violent ways in Langa.
EMERGENCY RULE, UNGOVERNABILITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMABUTHO
There is little doubt that the rising levels of police violence and
community counter-violence in Uitenhage were related to the threat
of removal. The youth squads by this stage were becoming
increasingly organised. Whereas outsiders visiting other communities
were greeted with the familiar clenched fist and pointed thumb sign
accompanied by the shout "Amandla", in Uitenhage they were greeted
with the call "Asxyi Kwanobuhle" ("We will not move to Kwanobuhle").
By July some of the youth squads were armed with stolen arms and
captured R.I rifles. They would agree amongst themselves who would
stand guard at selected points, watching for any attempt to demolish
shacks. They had their own quasi-military command structure and
identity. Crude gueriall tactics were devised to harass SADF-SAP
patrols. The most famous was the "hippo trap". A hole longer than
the length of a caspir and about four feet deep would be dug in the
road. Sheets of corrugated iron were then place over the hole and
disguised with a layer of sand. The next unsuspecting caspir that
came along would drop into the hole at which point a large
contingent of crudely armed youths would pounce on the caspir from
different sides. They would invariably be repulsed but, according to
some sources, not before a number of stones and petrol bombs were
thrown.
In addition to the military tactics of the youth, a politicised
culture emerged, spread and gained acceptance throughout the
community. The "toyi toyi" was the most visible manifestation of
this culture. These were dances performed in the streets by large
groups of mainly young people ranging in age from young children to
people in their early twenties. It took the form of a slow forward
moving jog accompanied by rhythmic freedom songs, most of which
were about or in praise of armed resistance, the ANC and its
leaders. Winding their way through the dusty dilapidated streets,
these groups performed two crucial political functions: they
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absorbed into their ranks increasing numbers of young people and
acted as effective means for communicating political messages on a
regular basis. Given that the style of this cominunication was
repetitive, relatively simple and widespread, it is not surprising
that their depiction of the threat of removal was in terms of a
white challenge to the "unity" of the Langa community. It was this
emotive rejection of removal, coupled to a political discourse of
national anti-Apartheid resistance, that underlay the determination
of many youth squads to meet violence with violence (15).
Alongside the youth groups, street committees had begun to emerge as
early as May in certain parts of Langa, i.e. some months before
they were being written about in the press and before they were
evident in other parts of the country (except, of course, in
Cradock). Nevertheless, although ever-widening layers of the
community were being politicised, the volatile and violent state of
conflict between the security forces and youth squads militated
against the organisational priorities of the activist leadership.
The declaration of the State of Emergency forced them underground
or into detention leaving the youth squads free to pursue their own
voluntarist strategies.
When Made got to Johannesburg in mid-June, foremost in his mind was
the rising level of violence in the township and its link to the
threat of removal:
"We now have a problem in Langa. It is surrounded by the
coloured area,the white area and the business sector area. The
white people of Levyvale, they made a petition asking the
government to remove the people from Langa to Kwanobuhle
because they said in their petition that they feel unsafe. They
said that Kwalanga is too near to them. The people of Langa
asked the whites to stop demanding the removal of Langa and
pointed out that it is the people of Langa who are unsafe from
these white soldiers and SAPs who enter our township carrying
guns, killing the people, killing the children and innocent
people. But the people of KwaLanga never signed a petition
about that. (16)
Another well-known Kwanobuhle-based UYCO activist was also in
Johannesburg at this time. He presented a similar picture of
escalating violence but went further to say that activists who still
supported non-violent methods of organisation and resistance were
finding it increasingly difficult to justify their position and even
prescence in the township. He told one of his friends in Soweto that
he decided to come to Johannesburg after a crowd forced him to light
the petrol of a knecklace after he voiced strong objections to that
method of punishment (17).
Although the position of the activist leadership became even more
tenuous after the Emergency was declared in July, they were
painfully aware at this stage - as were the national leadership -
that unless "mass mobilisation" was turned into "mass organisation",
township politics could degenerate into a straight military
confrontation which the communities could never win.
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For the next few months the Uitenhage leadership ceased to operate
as a coherent force. Although some were detained (e.g. Haas), others
disappeared underground. The only groups who remained organised and
retained the capacity to mobilise opposition to the security forces
were the amabuhto. The trade unions concentrated on protecting the
union's base in the face of mounting repression and increasingly
politicised communities.
Rather than resolving Langa's problems, the State of Emergency
exacerbated them. With the security forces and amabutho squads
battling it out on the streets, the township administrators were
unable to restore the council's authority and it was too risky for
community activists to pursue above-ground legal organisational
methods. Not surprisingly, negotiations on the removal question in
this context were remote. In any case, Mr. Haas, the leader of the
delegation that met KTC in June, was detained. The only communal
response to the Emergency was the consumer boycott which was resumed
in late July after being called off in early July. However, in the
absence of an organisational infrastructure capable of coping at
this stage with extreme repression and given the militarised nature
of daily conflict, the renewed consumer boycott was coercively
enforced by the amabutho who staffed "people's roadblocks" to check
whether residents had purchased goods in town.
SHIFTING BATTLELINES, NEW TACTICS
As endemic violence continued, both the state and community
organisations realised new strategies were required to move beyond
this no-win situation. Whereas the state decided to proceed with the
-removals in a more direct and purposive manner,
the community activists attempted to establish new structures to
cope with repression, removal and mass support.
By the end of October conditions began to change in two respects.
Firstly, leaders began to re-emerge determined to operate
underground in ways that kept them out of sight as far as the
security forces were concerned but in contact with their
constituencies. Having monitored the methods and strategies of the
security forces fairly closely so as to identify predictable
patterns, the activists decided to re-emerge and operate in ways
they thought least risky. This is when the street committees became
crucially important as defensive structures. Secondly, and related
to the new organising style of the activists, older residents began
reacting to youth domination of township politics by establishing
their own structures to represent their interests. This led to the
spread of the street committees and the formation of Parents Crisis
Committees in line with the national SPCC initiative to bring the
schools boycott to an end.
The semi-underground activist leadership plugged into these street
committee and parent's initiatives because they supported the need
to establish organisational bases capable of countering the power of
the amabutho. What followed was an important series of conflicts
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over the control and direction of the street committes and Parents1
Committees as older residents and activists struggled to assert a
less militaristic and non-voluntarist approach. Ironically, it was
renewed attempts by KTC to evict 426 squatter families in October
that galvanised older residents into action.
It was in this light that it became necessary for the leadership to
find strategies to deal with new needs and pressures. These
included: (a) space to organise; (b) the need to reassert political
authority to displace the dominance of the youth squads; (c)
concessions to sustain organisation; and (d) defense against
repression. This was the context that led key Langa leaders to the
conclusion that firstly, negotiations with the local authority must
be re-initiated; and secondly, that organisational structures must
be decentralised along street committee lines, a particularly
important step if the support of the older residents was to be
retained (18).
By late September the KTC and its Administrator, Barry Erasmus,
appointed on 13th September, was caught between two contradictory
pressures. Firstly, the Uitenhage municipality, responding to
renewed demands from its white ratepayers for the removal of Langa,
was becoming increasingly insistent that KTC do something about the
expanding squatter camp. To increase its pressure on KTC, the
Uitenhage municipality appealed to Minister Heunis at the National
Party's congress held in Port Elizabeth in September, to intervene
directly on its behalf (19). Secondly, the continued unrest in
Langa that repressive tactics seemed unable to quell, virtually
brought daily township administration to a standstill. This enabled
incoming squatters to erect shacks in the 4th-9th ave area (more on
this later) thus fueling white opposition to the continued
existence of Langa. KTC realised that a resolution to the squatter
problem was impossible without bringing an end to the unrest (20).
-It took the KTC until September to work out a clear strategy because
of bureaucratic confusion within the local state. Although Erasmus
was formally appointed as Administrator on 13th September in terms
of the Law on Co-operation and Development Second Amendment Act, he
had been what Heunis called an "advisor" to KTC's town clerk since
June (21), i.e. one month after his early retirement from Uitenhage
Municipality where he was town clerk. Furthermore, lines of
authority were unclear because responsibility for Black Local
Authorities was transferred to the Department of Constitutional
Development and Planning in July following the cabinet reshuffle
that finally dismantled that old Verwoerdian empire, namely the
Department of Cooperation and Development.
Significantly, Erasmus said he turned down the offer of a senior
management position at Volkswagen in order to accept his post (22).
This points to a link between Erasmus and Volkswagen that was to
crucially affect the outcome of the Langa struggle in 1986.
As the bureaucratic dust began to settle, KTC devised two strategies
to deal with the pressures it was facing - one coercive and the
other concessionary. The concessionary response arose out of a
memorandum that Coetzee sent to the Department of Constitutional
Development and Planning (DCDP) reporting the demands expressed by
the Langa delegation that met KTC in June. Responding to the
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community's strong demand for upgrading, the DCDP appointed a
special Task Group to investigate the Langa problem (23) and its
existence was publicly announced by Heunis at the NP Congress (24) .
The Task Group comprised members of various government departments
including the police and army, Barry Erasmus and was chaired by Dr.
Scheepers, deputy director-general of the DCDP. The Task Group's
brief was to investigate the feasibility of upgrading the area
between 22nd and 9th avenues and to compile a Guide Plan.
Two points must be noted: firstly, the fact that squatting was only
taking place between 22nd and 9th avenues up until June, and that
the Task Group's brief was limited to this area, meant that no
account was taken of how rapidly the shack settlement was growing.
This meant that agreements reached in June were irrelevant by
October when literally hundreds more shacks had been erected.
Secondly, the Pretoria-based state engineer who worked on the
project was told to operate within a conventional planning framework
which is deeply hostile to the concept of in sutu squatter upgrading
along lines proposed by the Urban Foundation (25). Nevertheless, the
seniority of the chairperson bears testimony to the importance
attached to the Langa problem.
It was also at this point that the NP MP for Uitenhage, a Mr. D. Le
Roux, got directly involved in the Langa problem. Le Roux is an
extremely confident and bright man in his late thirties. He is the
senior partner of the most prestigious firm of Uitenhage attorneys
whose offices are located in the old colonial magistrate's building,
complete with palm trees and colonades at the entrance. His office
is lined with hunting trophies, pictures of afrikaner ancestors and
of his old rugby and 'varsity teams. His firm acted for the
Kwanobuhle Town Council and because Erasmus used to be Uitenhage's
Town Clerk, Le Roux new him intimately. Together Le Roux and Erasmus
made up a formidable duo of skilful manipulators.
-Although KTC's coercive response was formulated in a private caucus
between Le Roux and Erasmus, it was formally recorded at a meeting
of "the council" (i.e. Coetzee and Erasmus) held on 30th September
1985, shortly after the NP Congress. On this occasion, a resolution
was taken to empower the Town Clerk to instruct the KTC's attorneys
(i.e. Le Roux) to institute an action or alternatively an
Application in the Supreme Court to secure the "removal of all
illegal shacks/homes and/or structures in and the eviction of all
persons living in the area between 9th avenue ... and 4th" (26).
Having chosen not to go for a Supreme Court Application, on 8
October KTC served eviction notices on 426 squatters living between
9th and 4th avenues. The notices were delivered between 2am and 4am
by KTC officials accompanied by a phalanx of SADF troops who
aggressively broke down doors and damaged shacks. This response was
clearly designed to remove squatters closest to the white areas in
order to temporarily assuage white fears until a more permanent
solution could be found. It was no coincidence that the 426
squatters occupied the only part of Langa that was visible from the
white suburbs. However, the carefully worded eviction notice
prepared by Le Roux, gave very different reasons for the removal.
The notice pointed out to each shack dweller:
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* his/her shack was erected without "any permit or authority from
KTC" and is "accordingly an illegal structure";
* the shacks are a health hazard with the danger of a cholera
outbreak beause in the area between 9th and 4th avenues there are no
toilets, water supplies, drainage or sewerage;
* the area is a fire hazard because the shacks have been built in a
manner which prevents "proper access".
It must be borne in mind that the eviction orders were violating the
patronage contracts between councillors and squatters, contracts
which squatters could "prove" because councillors issued them with
"Lodger's Permits" in the name of the Cape Midlands Bantu Affairs
Administration Board and stamped with a Uitenhage-Despatch Community
Council stamp (this patronage network was analysed in chapter 7)).
Consequently, the eviction notice contained a paragraph which
clearly stated that if "you have been shown a site by certain
persons who have taken it upon themselves to allocate sites in the
area for shacks" and/or if "you paid any money to a person in order
to allocate a shack site to you", then this person acted illegally.
This legal protection against potential claims that squatters were
given "permission" to reside in the area was coupled to another more
serious measure. When the KTC officials and SADF troops served the
notices, they asked the squatters to surrender their permits.
Although most unsuspectingly obliged, a few wiley old women with
years of experience that had taught them that possessing
official-looking documents is better than having nothing, simply
refused by saying they had lost their permits (27). Nevertheless, by
surrendering their permits the majority gave up their only proof
that someone officially sanctioned their right to reside in the
area. By defining this sanction as illegal the eviction notice
overturned the community's popular conception of the existing
consensus and their residential rights.
Aware of the political consequences of this violation of popular
norms and patronage contracts, the KTC attempted to establish and
legitimise a new norm. The eviction notices stated that the KTC is
"aware of the need for housing" and has, therefore, provided fully
serviced sites in Kwanobuhle at a monthly cost of R19.90. In
addition, the notice stated, KTC will transport all belongings from
Langa to Kwanobuhle free of charge.
The notice ends by stating that the shack dweller has ten days to
remove his/her structures. If he/she fails to do so, the KTC will
assume that he/she "thereby contest [s] the right of the Council to
remove you" and it will then apply for a court order to remove the
shack by force.
The eviction notices generated a sense of panic and outrage in the
community as a whole. Panic because the removal of the 426 squatters
was seen as the first step towards the removal of Langa as a whole.
Outrage because a popular norm - despite it being rooted in the
patronage networks of the councillors - had been violated. The
effect on political consciousness was immediate and electric.
Fortuitously, the following day was October 9, the Day of Peace and
Reconciliation that Bishop Tutu and other prominent clergy had
called to protest against the State of Emergency. Although there was
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general confusion in most parts of the country as to whether this
day was meant to be a stayaway or not, in Langa the message was
rapidly spread through the street committees that no-one must go to
work and that as many people as possible must squeeze into Langa's
eleven churches to discuss Langa's problems in general and the
evictions in particular. Disguised as "prayer meetings", discussion
about the evictions and other problems went on throughout the day,
providing activists with a rare opportunity to canvass a broad
spread of opinion at a time when all meetings were banned under the
Emergency regulations. It also enabled discussions to take place
that led to the re-imposition of the consumer boycott two days
later.
The activists, taking full advantage of the opportunity, divided
themselves into groups and took charge of proceedings in the
churches. They had agreed amongst themselves that although the usual
speeches, freedom songs and discussion was important, the main aim
should be to ask the meetings to throw up demands related
specifically to Langa. These were written down in order of priority.
At the end of the day the activists met and, as one of them put it,
"Congress of the People style" put all the demands together,
categorised and prioritised them. The result was six key demands
(wording as in original):
"* lifting of influx control;
* relieving unemployment;
* upgrading of township: who is the cause of health and fire
hazard?
* people must be allowed to live where they like;
* schools, clinics, creches, playing grounds;
* allow us to hold meetings and air our views."
These demands were, in effect, thrown up from the grassroots in a
popular manner. They represented, therefore, the community's answer
to the Task Group whose recommendations were bound to be purely
technical and conventional and were kept secret and never revealed
to the community.
A committee was elected from these meetings to represent the
squatters and mandated to meet KTC to appeal against the eviction.
The committee comprised Freddie Magugu (FOSATU), Weza Made (UYCO),
Sipho Mandabana (MACWUSA), T.E. Majoka (UYCO - Kwanobuhle), Z. Mge
(UYCO - Kwanobuhle), M.E. Antonie (FOSATU), Nelson Teyise (street
committees), Rev. Bashman and A.F. Diko (?). This committee became
known as the Langa Coordinating Committee (LCC) with Made, Magugu,
Mandabana and Teyise as the core actors. Significantly, the LCC
included FOSATU representatives thus signalling the beginnings of
cooperative relations that transcended the old animosities between
the Gomomo and Kobese groups. It was Magugu, Made, Mandabana and
others who represented the new generation of trade union and
community activists who decided to ignore divisions in the
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established leadership and forge working relations between the
street committees and shop floor structures. To quote Lund's
observation on this issue:
"Leaving aside the most vocal and vociferous feuders, they set
about work at grassroots amongst the bereaved and frightened,
building new forms of organisation in Langa." (28)
Although the anti-removal struggle provided a material basis for
cooperation between community organisations and trade unions, this
was soon extended into other matters. After the formation of COSATU
in late 1985, trade unions got direct representation on street
committees, Consumer Boycott Committee, the LCC and the Uitenahage
Residents Civic Organisation (URECO).
LOCAL MOVES BEYOND EMERGENCY RULE
The LCC immediately contacted KTC and requested a meeting to discuss
the removals and urged KTC to stay the evictions. KTC agreed not to
go ahead with removals until the meeting had taken place. The fact
that the meeting took place on the 22nd October, i.e. four days
after the deadline to move had elapsed, greatly strengthened the
resolve of the squatters and activists who interpreted this
concession as a sign of weakness on the part of KTC. In reality, the
local state was deeply concerned about the political implications of
the evictions (29). This concern was motivated by the fact that
Volkswagen wanted to avoid at all costs another blow-up in Langa
because of the international profile of the township. Le Roux, the
KTC and elements in the municipality were well aware of the
conseqeunces of a Volkswagen pull-out if the international spotlight
-on Langa resulted in disinvestment pressure on Volswagen's German
headquarters. KTC tried on several occasions prior to October 8th to
arrange meetings with the LCC, but the response was that no meetings
would take place until Mr. Haas was released from detention (30) . In
the end, mounting pressure from Uitenhage municipality forced KTC to
issue eviction notices (31). When this galvanised the community
organisations into action, including the LCC's decision to request a
meeting and drop its pre-condition that Haas be released, the KTC
was more than willing to find a way of going ahead with the removal
without escalating the unrest. Coetzee and Erasmus genuinely
believed they could convince the leaders to support the removal with
scary reports about health hazards, welfarist housing concessions in
Kwanobuhle and denials about the influence of white pressure on
their decision.
The meeting was delayed because the LCC knew that meeting KTC to
simply appeal against the removal was too weak and reactive. They
were aware of the need to make concrete counter-proposals in line
with the community's demands. As a result, they contacted the group
of Johannesburg and Durban-based academics they had had contact
with before the Emergency and urged them to come down before the
meeting with KTC.
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The meeting with the KTC took place on the appointed day at 4.00 pm
in the KTC's Langa offices. As far as upgrading was concerned,
Barry Erasmus said that the Task Group was favourably disposed
towards this idea, but agreed with the KTC that Langa was only big
enough for 2000 sites and that 8000 sites were needed to accomodate
all Langa's inhabitants. Erasmus informed the LCC that the Task
Group would be holding its first meeting on 28th October in
Uitenhage.
Erasmus explained that eviction notices were served on the 426
squatters living between 9th and 4th avenues because of the
appalling living conditions in the area and the constant threat of a
cholera outbreak. He rejected press speculation that the evictions
were motivated by a concern for Group Area boundaries. He said that
those who moved to Kwanobuhle would be given a serviced site, free
transport to the new area and unemployed people would not be
required to pay service charges. Employed persons who wanted to
erect houses would be given loans from the council to purchase
on-site materials and council-paid labour would be made available.
In short, KTC was making every possible concession to attract people
to Kwanobuhle. Free services for unemployed people and cheap loans
and labour for those who wanted to erect houses were, in effect,
welfarist policies.
Made responded on behalf of the LCC delegation by pointing out that
the community is prepared to negotiate solutions to any problems and
difficulties it experiences. He then went on to say that the LCC
called the meeting to discuss the eviction notices that were handed
out. He pointed out, (a) that the squatters were unhappy about the
10 day ultimatum to move to Kwanobuhle, (b) that people were angered
by the actions of soldiers who damaged shacks when doors were kicked
open, (c) that the LCC was discontented by the fact that KTC went
ahead with the eviction notices without consulting them, and (d) the
-people want their permits returned to them.
Much of what followed amounted to argumentation about various
conflicting perceptions and reports about what was happening
between 9th and 4th avenues. In particular, it became evident to
the officials that the LCC was not buying their arguments. The
former's position was finally discredited when at one stage Erasmus
found it necessary to defend white fears by pointing out that
Levyvale residents complained of regular burglaries, seven petrol
bomb attacks and dropping property values.
Erasmus said there were three ways to deal with the squatter
problem: (a) shacks could be demolished by KTC officials
immediately; (b) a court order could be obtained from a magistrate;
(c) an application to the Supreme Court could be made. As far as
Coetzee and Erasmus were concerned, the latter option was best
because it would allow the community to put forward its case
following which the Supreme Court decision - which they were
confident would go in their favour - could be implemented. This
would create the appearance of neutrality and fairness (32) by
redefining the issue in legalistic terms, he Roux worked out this
scheme to use the Supreme Court to depoliticise the issue (33). In
the long run, as the local state intended, this forced the community
organisations onto a terrain where they were weakest.
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In response to Erasmus' proposals and in a clear bid to retain
control of the decision-making process, the LCC requested a meeting
with the Task Group and if this failed, that Erasmus ask the Task
Group to include the 9th-4th ave area into the upgrading plan. The
officials recommended that the LCC submit a memorandum to the Task
Group. The officials agreed to request that the Task Group meet the
LCC. In return, however, they requested the LCC to ensure that no
further shacks were erected. The Committee, unlike the Councillors
before them, refused to give this undertaking.
On a number of levels the activists felt "the negotiations" were a
success: the removal had been stalled; the KTC had effectively
recognised the LCC as the representative of the Langa community;
KTC agreed to support the inclusion of the 4th-9th ave area into the
definition of the area which must be upgraded; and the KTC's support
for the proposal that the Task Group meet the LCC was won (34). The
other gain - that activists never percieved as such because it was
not related directly to the removal question - was the welfarist
housing and settlement policies the KTC was proposing for
Kwanobuhle. These were substantially improved concessions to what
they were offering in June.
On the negative, the community organisations were being drawn into
legalistic struggles coupled to a dependence on experts that was to
weaken rather than strengthen organisation in the long run. Some
activists were keenly aware of these dangers. However, they were
not simply strategic or organisational problems. They were, in
fact, inscribed into the institutional framework within which the
community organisations and trade unions had to operate. This
applies to their inability to challenge the decision to take the
matter to the Supreme Court, the necessity for "experts" once the
decision was taken to enter into negotiations and the sustained
level of repression that severely constrained mass participation in
-the complex and intricate negotiation and planning processes.
After the meeting with the KTC, activists brought Dr. Mike
Sutcliffe, an urban planner and member of the Durban-based Built
Environment Support Group (BESG), to Uitenhage. He compiled a
memorandum entitled A Feasibility Survey of the Prospects for
Upgrading Kabah, Uitenhage that supported all the basic arguments of
the community.
Sutcliffe's memorandum was handed in to the KTC early on the morning
of Monday 27th October in time to be discussed at the Task Group
meeting that day. Not unexpectedly, the KTC officials were extremely
surprised when the LCC arrived with the memorandum. They never
thought the LCC had the resources or the inclination to compile a
memorandum during the short time since the last meeting. In the
event, the Task Group did not discuss the memo that day.
The LCC met the KTC again on 28th October. It started off with a
report back by Erasmus of the Task Group proceedings the previous
day. Erasmus pointed out that the Task Group was of the opinion that
urbanisation was inevitable, but that the most pressing problem was
the influx of unemployed people into the urban areas. Nevertheless,
the Task Group favourably regarded the prospects for upgrading
Langa. That this view was expressed then is significant, because it
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pre-figures government thinking that eventually led to the scrapping
of influx control in July 1986. This might suggest that Langa's
struggle and the very real difficulties it posed for the state, made
a direct impact on central government policy.
The LCC forcefully expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact
that the Task Group never considered their memorandum and that the
only firm decision concerned the need to go ahead with a court
order. Magugu submitted that this indicated a refusal by government
to listen to the Langa community's demands and that there is,
therefore, no reason why there should be further negotiations. The
KTC replied by trying to re-define the issue in legalistic and
technicist terms. The legalistic solution lay in the KTC's constant
insistence that the LCC respond in court to the KTC's application,
i.e. they clearly percieved that the community's willingness to
"participate" in the legal action would ensure its "success", no
matter what the outcome was. Keeping the conflict off the streets
was their only concern.
Contrary to Lund's suggestion that negotiations had "come to
nothing" (Lund, 1986: p. 59) because the KTC and Task Group were of
the opinion that upgrading would only be considered after the court
ruling, the evidence seems to point to a much more sophisticated
divide through concession and rule through repression strategy:
concessions to those living in the 22nd-9th ave area and repression
for the 9th-4th ave area. This is why
Finally, and confirming the Task Group's technicist thrust, when the
LCC asked whether Erasmus had asked the Task Group to meet the
Committee, Erasmus said the request was denied because "the
politicians" would be brought in and deliberations would be delayed.
Later, when the Urban Foundation attempted to urge Scheepers to meet
the LCC, the Task Group's response was that its task was technical,
not political. Only after he had reported to Heunis, Scheepers
-pointed out, could this decision be made (35).
Although the Task Group did not oppose the need to apply for a
court order to remove the 9th-4th ave squatters, there is no
evidence that any clarity existed in state circles on whether Langa
should be retained and upgraded and, if so, how this should be done.
This reflected an uncertainty in government urbanisation policy as
a whole. The conflict in Langa, therefore, came at a time when two
contradictory tendencies were reaching a head at national level: on
the one hand the squatter communities were clearly winning the
battle against influx control and their struggles helped destroy
the classic myth that the urban areas were an exclusive white abode.
These struggles finally buried the Riekert Commission's urbanisation
policy and the intentions of the fated Orderly Movement and
Settlement of Black Persons Bill. On the other hand, by the end of
1985 policy makers had come to support the Urban Foundation's
argument that influx control needed to be scrapped, but like the
Urban Foundations' policy makers they were unclear about what should
replace it (36).
In light of the LCC's firm position, the Task Group's confusion,
right-wing pressure from Uitenhage and spreading shack construction,
the KTC decided to apply for a Supreme Court order.
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By the beginning of November the community organisations were
uncertain where they stood: negotiations had broken down, the Task
Group engineer claimed he was still conducting his study, and KTC
was probably preparing its case but this was by no means certain.
The KTC strategy only became clear on 8th November when the KTC
served notices of motion on the 426 squatters in the 9th-4th ave
area. These notices were handed out between 2.00 am and 4.00 am in
an extremely provocative manner. One policeman said to a resident:
"We know you are going to resist, but let us see who is going to
win." (37)
The notice of motion that was given to the 426 squatters was a
lengthy 78-page document with detailed maps, photographs and
affidavits to back up its case. The KTC supported its case with the
following basic arguments:
(a) uncontrolled squatting in the 9th-4th ave is taking place at
such a rate that 10 new shacks are erected each day; (b) the
structures were put up without the Applicants permission or
knowledge; (c) there are no taps, sewerage or refuse removal
services in the area, thus creating the real danger of a cholera or
typhoid outbreak; (d) proper roads do not exist because of the
unplanned nature of the area, which means that in the event of a
fire, the Fire Brigade would be unable to stop it; (e) 400 residents
of Uitenhage signed a petition that prompted the Uitenhage
Municipality to lodge a formal complaint with the KTC about the
"dangerous and unsanitary conditions" in Langa; (f) the drainage and
slope of the land is such that "while upgrading of this area may be
theoretically possible, it is not possible at any practicably
acceptable cost level"; (g) fully serviced sites have been made
available in Kwanobuhle in an area that "is about the same distance
from the Uitenhage industrial area ... as the illegal shacks"; (h)
attempts to encourage the squatters to move voluntarily by
negotiating with "unofficial representatives" failed, thus leading
-the KTC to conclude that the "Respondents dispute the illegality of
their occupation in the area".
The key component of the notice was provided by an affidavit from
Major Theron. Theron was in charge of Uitenhage's Riot Control Unit
as of March 1984. He argued that the "high density" and "unplanned"
nature of the shack area has given rise to a situation that "is
extremely difficult to patrol and to police properly".
"There are no proper streets or street numbers - nor are there
any passable roads. Attempts to put up street numbers have been
frustrated by elements in the population who remove the numbers
or over-paint them. Because this happens at night, it is not
possible to say who is responsible." (38)
Criminals are protected in the area because it is "very difficult to
trace witnesses afterwards who melt away into the mass of unplanned,
haphazard shacks". However, Theron proceeds, the same does not apply
to the new area in Kwanobuhle to which the KTC would like to move
the squatters. Revealing the intimate connection between urban
planning and police control, Theron points out that "[i]n this area
Police protection of residents will become vastly facilitated [sic]
and investigation of crime tremendously simplified." (39)
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It is important to note that Coetzee's affidavit specifically
pointed out that the 9th-4th ave squatters had erected shacks
without in any way notifying or informing the KTC. This is
significant because it means that unlike the 22nd-9th ave squatters,
the 9th-4th squatters erected their shelter without the condonement
of councillors and their patronage networks. The resignation of the
councillors, therefore, had two contradictory effects: it removed
the protection of patronage but simultaneously created the
impression that official obstacles to the erection of shacks had
also been removed. The ideology of ungovernability served to confirm
this latter impression. But when it became clear that the KTC was
still able to function and threaten the squatters, it was not the
patronage networks that they turned to for support but rather the
extra-state organisations whose commitment to oppose the state
offered a solution that made sense to people whose attempts to find
an accomodation within the system had failed.
The delivery of these notices clearly drew the battlelines. As far
as the local state was concerned, the first priority was the
clearing of the 9th-3rd ave area to satisfy the white residents.
Once this was achieved, the rest was negotiable. However, given the
politicised nature of the community, the KTC was attempting to
legitimise the removal by way of a Supreme Court Action that would
require the "participation" of the community in a process which had
a disguised in-built bias against them - an advantage for the state
that was absent in the negotiation process. KTC officials hoped in
this way to at least diminish to acceptable levels the
confrontational aspect of the removal.
Between November 1985 and May 1986, a stalemate existed. Except for
the demolition of twenty newly erected shacks on the outskirts of
the 4th-9th ave area "because they were challenging the authority of
the Kwanobuhle municipality" (40), neither side opted for
-negotiated or coercive strategies to win the strategic initiative.
The community needed to build organisation and formulate its
alternative to removal, while the KTC waited for its case to be
heard by the court. This stalemate was not affected by moves to
suspend the consumer boycott and bring about negotiations in
accordance with the Port Elizabeth example (41).
The Uitenhage Consumer Boycott Committee said its demands were the
withdrawal of troops and members of the SAP's reaction unit from the
townships; lifting of the State of Emergency; an end to the
harassment of community leaders by security forces; that all workers
sacked because of stayaways from work or through detention under the
Emergency be reinstated; that Langa be upgraded and the forced
removal of residents to Kwanobuhle halted; the prosecution of the
killers of the Cradock leaders and the location of the missing Port
Elizabeth leaders (42) .
On Sunday 8th December, a mass meeting took place in Jabavu Stadium
in Kwanobuhle to discuss the consumer boycott. Permission was
granted by the magistrate when applications to hold the meeting were
supported by the KTC (43). The meeting agreed that negotiations with
the Chamber of Commerce could take place only if Uitenhage's
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detainees were released (44). In the event Uitenhage's Consumer
Boycott never culminated in the high profile negotiations that ended
the Port Elizabeth boycott.
There were three reasons why the consumer boycott "talks" in
Uitenhage went in a very different direction to those in Port
Elizabeth. Firstly, unlike the Port Elizabeth chamber, the Uitenhage
Chamber of Commerce was National Party dominated. Secondly, the
pillar of economic power in Uitenhage was industrial capital, not
commerce - this is why the (Midlands Chamber of Industries (MCI) and
not the Chamber of Commerce eventually came to play such a crucial
role later on. Thirdly, unlike the Ibhayi Town Council, all the
councillors resigned from KTC leaving the white officials with much
greater scope for proactive intervention and unconventional action.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the KTC became the central actor.
During December and January Erasmus went on the offensive to coopt
Kwanobuhle and Langa leaders into a multi-racial ad hoc committee to
discuss new local authority arrangements for Uitenhage as a whole.
Despite the failure of this committee, Erasmus was deeply impressed
with the URECO leaders he spoke to (45) and his optimism was
reflected in a press statement he made at the time:
"There is a conciliatory spirit at the moment. There is an
atmosphere of change." (46)
It was in this context that Erasmus called for a local
power-sharing option for Uitenhage. He made this suggestion at a
special symposium for the public and private sector in December 1985
to consider Uitenhage's future prospects. He suggested that black
community leaders be incorporated into the special "contact
committee" that the Uitenhage municipality had recently established
in response to the consumer boycott. He argued that this will help
improve Uitenhage's image as a place with one of the worst race
-relations problems in the world (47).
Even the school pupils voted at mass meetings in stadiums at
Kwanobuhle and Langa that they should return to school on the 28th
January in line with resolutions taken at the Johannesburg
conference of the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee.
The easing of tensions in the Eastern Cape from the end of '85 and
into January '86 was clearly part of a shift in state strategy.
Withdrawal of the massive security force prescence, negotiations
with UDF organisations, release of detainees and other moves were
also coupled to an injection of R43 million into township
development. Minister Heunis personally handed the cheque over to
the ECDB in November. To be used for unemployment relief,
infrastructural upgrading, self-help housing and the training of
municipal police, these funds were distributed to 35 E. Cape
townships with Aliwal North, Bedford, Cathcart, Cradock, Fort
Beaufort, Grahamstown, King William's Towm, Kirkwood, Molteno, East
London, Queenstown, Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth recieving the
largest amounts (48). These areas, not surprisingly, were the most
well organised E. Cape towns. Although the municipal police forces
this fund helped establish were to play an important repressive role
later on, this was not immediately apparant at this stage.
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BUILDING PEOPLE'S POWER
(BECAUSE OF STRICT SPACE LIMITATIONS THIS SECTION HAS BEEN LEFT OUT.
It covers the origin, structure and compositon of the street
committees and a breakdown of popular ideology and consciousness.)
EXPLOITING THE CONTRADICTIONS
Given the context within which popular mobilisation was taking
place, the mere existence of popular structures was insufficient
when it came to making gains. This grassroots power needed to be
coupled to the use of a range of instruments if the outcome was
going to be anything other than straight repression. From late 1985
but more concertedly from early January 1986, a combination of
tactics was devised by the activists to complement grassroots
organising.
Realising the importance of communicating their demands as widely as
possible, the activists cooperated with their allies to publicise
Langafs struggle. Working closely with Sue Lund of the GRC, Mono
Badela of City Press and the author, the activists attempted to
build Langa into a story that could remain in the headlines. This
turned out to be remarkably successful.
With regard to KTC's supreme court application, a decision was taken
to contest it. Significantly, this decision did not follow a debate
in the organisations. As far as the activists were concerned, they
constantly reiterated the danger of a full-frontal violent
confrontation between the authorities and the squatters if the
removals went ahead. The prospect that this moment could be
postponed by way of a protracted legal battle was more than
-appealing to them. Nevertheless, in a brief meeting that the LCC
initiated with the KTC in February, Made urged the KTC to withdraw
its case because the people were unwilling to defend themselves in
court and would not, in any case, respect the findings of the court
(49) .
The most important part of the overall strategy used to counter the
removals - besides grassroots organisation - was the commissioning
of an alternative development plan. GRC, BESG and PLANACT were
instructed to proceed with the survey as the first step towards
formulating an alternative upgrading plan for Langa. The brief to
BESG and PLANACT was to formulate an upgrading plan based on four
principles: (a) upgrading must take place for the whole of Langa,
not just a part as the KTC was recommending; (b) the plan must take
into account the needs of all strata, particularly the unemployed;
(c) financial formulae must be based on what people can afford; (d)
the upgrading process must be democratically controlled. The
decision to go ahead with this initiative without official sanction
was communicated to the KTC at a meeting on 3rd February. One of the
resolutions taken at the end of this meeting that expressed the
feelings of the LCC went as follows:
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"That all planning with regard to the upgrading of Kabah BE
DONE in conjunction with the Coordinating Committee of Kabah.
Furthermore that it BE NOTED that any planning done without the
consent of the committee would be rejected by the people of
Kabah." (minutes of KTC-LCC meeting, 3.2.86, emphasis in
original)
It was decided not to abandon negotiations. However, the activists
ruled out any possibility of talking sense into the KTC officials
and decided, therefore, to meet the Task Group which was percieved
as a higher authority that may be more rational and responsive. To
reach the Task Group, activists decided to try to go through the KTC
once again and also the Urban Foundation. At the February 3rd
meeting with the KTC, the LCC's main request was that the KTC make
contact with the Task Group to ask it to meet the LCC. In addition,
the academics were requested to set up a meeting with the Urban
Foundation which, the activists decided, would be requested to
support Langa's struggle and take steps to pressurise Dr. Scheepers
into meeting the LCC. It was this meeting that saw the beginning of
the most interesting phase of the Langa story: the development of an
alliance between business, trade unions and community organisations.
However, unlike in the Crossroads case, this alliance was not
characterised by the dominance of business and reformist interests
(50).
The Urban Foundation (UF) meeting took place on Sunday 10 November,
two days after the notices were handed to the 9th-4th ave squatters.
An agreement was reached that the UF would try to secure a meeting
between the LCC and Scheepers and that in the event that upgrading
is allowed to take place, the UF would work with the community and
not the state. Underpinning this was UF support for Langa'a
anti-removal struggle (51) .
As far as the activists were concerned, this meeting was a success
-because it won them a powerful ally and the UF could provide
crucial technical skills in the event of state approval of
upgrading. The significance of this alliance only emerged later when
the state attempted to undermine it. The UF team was under
surveillance when it arrived in Uitenhage (Erasmus and Coetzee,
26.5.87). That night, the UF's Port Elizabeth offices were broken
into and searched. More significantly, Heunis later communicated his
displeasure to the UF's Jan Steyn questioning why the UF had agreed
to cover the legal costs of the Supreme Court action. Heunis
communicated this grievance to Fred du Plessis as well. As far as
the KTC officials were concerned, PLANACT and BESG were merely UF
fronts that Matlock established to hide his involvement in Langa
(52).
Made was under no illusions about the game that needed to be played.
He said this to a visiting UDF organiser:
"We called the director of the Urban Foundation and its eastern
cape director. We told them that the people see the foundation
as a government created structure and the people are aware that
the Urban Foundation was created immediately after the 1976
riots for the purpose of neutralising and normalising the
situation. In its projects it works hand-in-hand with the
councillors which are not representing our community. We told
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them that most of their projects are unpopular among the
people. They build houses which people cannot afford, and the
rental of their houses is expensive. We even told them that
they are helping the government by forcibly removing people for
its strategic reasons by building these houses. We asked them
to disassociate themselves from the government if they want to
regain credibility. We told that in future if they want to
build houses they must consult with the people." (53)
This meeting resulted in a re-allignment in relations between the UF
and extra-parliamentary organisations in the Eastern Cape.
Obviously, this re-allignment affected the UF's relationships with
the state. In particular, in a letter to Erasmus, Matlock spelt out
his support for, (a) "process oriented housing mechanisms as
opposed to the normal product oriented housing delivery mechanism";
(b) in-situ upgrading of informal settlements; and (c) the
necessity for "forming a coalition with communities in the planning
and implementation of select projects" (54). Obviously these
policies differed drastically from the KTC's technicist top-down
approach and should be interpreted as a response to pressures and
demands emanating from the black communities that the UF had to
deal with.
During December, January and the early part of February, the
activists concentrated on building organisation and completing the
survey?, By mid-February they had been sent to Sutcliffe who began
processing them.
About the time the questionaires were completed, the lawyers
notified the activists that the date set for the court case was 25
March. This gave the activists little over a month, but they also
realised the need to take full advantage of the fact that the court
case was to take place four days after the first anniversary of the
Langa massacre. In conjunction with PLANACT and GRC members, the
-LCC activists formulated a strategy. This involved the completion of
an upgrading report under the auspices of PLANACT and in conjunction
with GRC and BESG. This report, the LCC decided, should be completed
before the court case so that a press conference could be held to
announce the community's own proposals for a peaceful solution to
the Langa problem. Significantly, the LCC decided to invite everyone
to this press conference: the UDF affiliates, trade unions, all
Uitenhage employers, the KTC, Dr. Scheepers, Minister Heunis and his
senior officials.
In the meantime, the number of Langa squatters was increasing.
During the week of 10-14 February, eviction notices were served on
72 families who had built shacks alongside Kamesh Rd near the
coloured Community Centre. The case was heard on 15 April and an
order was granted that declared the shacks illegal and gave them
until April 30 to move to Kwanobuhle failing which their structures
would be dismantled. This effectively meant that if the squatters
failed to move, forced removals would take place on May Day, the
day COSATU planned on staging South Africa's biggest ever national
stayaway. Clearly the pressure was building up to a climax - some
residents could not handle it and about 70 families moved to
Kwanobuhle at this point (55) By this stage, however, a new set of
negotiations had been initiated that were to substantially alter the
balance of forces in the area.
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Surprisingly, everything worked according to plan. The academics
completed an upgrading report entitled Langa: The Case For Upgrade,
and a large press conference was held on 19 March attended by a
number of TV crews, journalists and business representatives. The
KTC never came and Heunis sent a telegram to Made's home address
apologising for not being able to attend. Press reports and
editorials remarked on the constructive nature of the press
conference and the report.
Weza Made opened the conference with these words:
"By calling this press conference it is our last attempt to
find a peaceful solution; this is out last attempt to prevent
bloodshed and confrontation with the government. ... We want
you to save the townshihp from explosion because if the
government can force us to move to this place we don't want, we
therefore have no alternative but to use force to use anything
at out disposal." (56)
The Eastern Cape's most prominent political and trade union leaders
were present and expressed solidarity. Stone Sizane of PEBCO and the
UDF Eastern Cape Executive, Michael Dube of COSATU's Eastern Cape
interim executive, and Gugile Nkwinti of Port Alfred who threatened
solidarity action from the hinterland towns if the Langa removals
proceeded. The report's basic conclusions were delivered by PLANACT
representatives who used socio-economic data, survey results and
urban planning theory to make a case for the feasibility of
upgrading Langa and the need for subsidised development.
Two days later the whole of black Uitenhage forcefully demonstrated
its unity and power by giving 99% support to the stayaway call on 21
March. Furthermore, 82% of Uitenhage's coloured workers also heeded
-the stayaway call (57). Over 60 000 people packed the Kwanobuhle
stadium for a day long rally in commemoration of the the victims of
the Langa massacre.
This stayaway marked the highpoint of community-union solidarity. In
dozens of factory meetings during the weeks leading up to the
stayaway, workers had debated the issue and come to a decision to
call a full day stayaway. This decision was widely supported in
street and area committee meetings. The combined impact of tight
workplace and community organisation around basic material
grievances ensured the success of the stayaway. This is why
grassroots activists were more than a little peeved when two days
before the stayaway the Kwanobuhle leadership issued a directive
that all workers must stayaway. (58).
Langa's problems, however, were by no means over. The court case
took place as scheduled on 25 March. It was clear that the state was
under tremendous pressure to find an amicable settlement by this
stage. Le Roux had this say about that period:
"There was active agitation to encourage people to move in and
squat. It became a real problem from the point of view of
control. There was nothing anybody could do to stop this flow
because the police, municipalities and management committees
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all feared an eruption. It then became a political test of
wills: the squatters defiantly moved towards the white areas.
The position was out of control. Everyone was scared of an
international incident. Everyone knew it was a bomb with a lid
on." (59)
Roger Matlock of the Urban Foundation phoned Dr. Scheepers of
Constitutional Development and Planning on the 21st to propose a
deal that went as follows: after KTC obtains a court order to evict
the squatters on the 25th, this should be used as a stick to
negotiate with the community from a position of strength. He urged
that direct removals should be avoided at all costs.
No doubt responding to international media coverage of Langa on the
anniversary of the massacre, from business pressure and from the
threat of extensive disruption, KTC' s lawyers arrived with a message
from Heunis on the morning of the 2 5th urging them to reach an
out-of-court settlement with the squatter leaders. The deal KTC
offered was that if the 9th-4th ave squatters agreed to move to
Kwanobuhle, they could live there rent free; while the rest of Langa
would be upgraded. Realising that if they agreed to this offer
without consulting the people,serious divisions could open up in the
community, the LCC turned it down. The case went ahead and judgement
was reserved indefinitely.
It appeared at this stage as if the LCC had now rejected the state's
final offer. The imperatives of extra-state organisation and the
potential for division if agreements were reached that resulted in
the sacrificing of the interests of even a minority group, were
pressures the LCC could not have ignored. Some of the LCC leaders
were well aware that it was "divide-and-rule" deals like this that
resulted in bloody intra-community conflicts in the western cape.
As mentioned above, the Kamesh Rd squatters case came to court on 15
April and a removal order was issued instructing squatters to vacate
the premises by 30 April. Obviously the Langa conflict was reaching
a head and the potential for major confrontations prompted
community, trade union and business leaders to seek last minute
solutions. Using the LCC call made at the press conference urging
business to involve themselves in the Langa conflict, and under
pressure from the unions to do likewise, the Uitenhage branch of MCI
decided to take action. Ronny Kruger of VW commented on this
decision by saying that "business has a responsibility to get
involved in issues that affect their workers. ... Happy employees
make for happy consumers." (60). The LCC met the MCI for a
preliminary meeting on the 25th April and it was agreed that future
meetings would take place to hammer out a compromise.
The MCI then took steps that managed to convince the KTC to stay the
removal of the Kamesh Rd squatters for ten days on the grounds that
the MCI wanted to meet trade union and community representatives in
an attempt to find a less violent solution. This intervention was
timeous because the Uitenhage municipality was under tremendous
pressure from its Conservative Party members to go for a full-on
armed confrontation to remove the Kamesh Rd squatters - an option
with widespread support in Uitenhage's white community. Using their
considerable influence, Le Roux and Erasmus - responding largely to
pressure from business - managed to convince the Deputy Sheriff and
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the Mayor to stay the removals for ten days. This bulwark against an
ultra-rightwing line brought together an informal five person
caucus of Uitenhage's most powerful white leaders - Le Roux,
Erasmus, Coetzee, Kruger, and Robyn Williams, Uitenhage's town
clerk. They met regularly to plan strategy and agreed to support a
negotiation/compromise position for the moment (61). This crucial
alliance between multi-national capital and the local state revolved
largely around two concerns: (a) the international consequences of a
violent eruption, and (b) the potential advantages of upgrading. It
was agreed that Kruger would act as the broker between the state and
community. Their objective was twofold: (a) to secure the removal to
Kwanobuhle of the Kamesh Rd squatters and the 9th-4th ave squatters;
and (b) upgrading of the rest of Langa (62). Their weapons were the
stick of forced removal and the carrot of upgrading.
Two mass meetings took place that cemented the alliance between
community organisations and trade unions that was to carry the next
round of negotiations through. The first was a mass political
funeral in Langa stadium where Weza Made spoke on the removal issue.
This was the first high profile mass meeting he had ever spoken at.
The second was a mass indoor meeting on Mayday. The speakers at this
meeting included Freddie Magugu, Wonga Nkala (UYCO president and
staunch socialist), John Gomomo of NAAWU and Weza Made. Made's
comment after the meeting was: "For the first time we see unity
between unions and community organisations. It was decided that
whatever we do, there should be joint decision-making." (63). From
this point on, the LCC became a core of leaders that comprised the
original four, i.e. Made, Magugu, Mandabana and Teyise, plus the
NAAWU leadership centred around Gomomo.
The meeting between the LCC, trade unionists and the MCI took place
on 2nd May - the day after all Uitenhage's workers stayed away for
political reasons. Only 11 africans out of a total of 7 615 employed
at Uitenhage's major enterprises turned up for work (64). The MCI
-delegates arrived at the meeting with a discussion paper relating to
solutions to the question of the Kamesh Rd squatters only. The paper
started by saying that any solution arrived at must be acceptable to
all the major political interests in Uitenhage. The paper defined
the root of the problem as the conflicting "interests arising from
the problems of rapid urbanisation".
Accepting the squatter's reasons for not wanting to move as being
ease of access to places of employment and the high cost of living
in Kwanobuhle, the MCI paper said it was prepared to "lobby support
for the implementation of the following":
1. that the Kamesh Rd area be zoned for community recreational
activities;
2. that Langa be upgraded and, if necessary extended to the north;
3. that any upgrading or other improvements be undertaken in a way
that alleviates unemployment in Langa, i.e by utilising labour from
the community.
In return for its support for these proposals, the MCI argued that
the community should agree that the Kamesh Rd squatters be
"temporarily and acceptably ... accomodated elsewhere."
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The LCC responded by making four points (65): firstly, if the Kamesh
Rd squatters agreed to move, this would be a sign of weakness that
could set a precedent for the removal of all Langafs squatters in
the future. Secondly, the leaders said they would refuse to agree to
any compromises until the basic principle that Langa be upgraded is
approved. Thirdly, and related to the second point, the leaders
argued that upgrading must be planned to ensure that it does not
only benefit the better-off sections of the community, but that the
poorest elements also benefit. Fourthly, they said it was
unacceptable that the only reason why people could not live in the
Kamesh Rd area was because it was zoned in terms of the Group Areas
act as "non-residential".
The MCI and LCC agreed to meet again on the 9th. The MCI delegates
went back to discuss the issues raised by the LCC with the caucus of
white leaders around Le Roux. The LCC returned to discuss various
options with the community. A special meeting for all Uitenhage's
organisations was held on Sunday 4th to discuss the removal and the
neeting with MCI. On the same day Made gave a moving speech to the
Kamesh Rd squatters. Relating the stories of Sofasonke's struggles
in Johannesburg in the 1940s and the contemporary struggle for
Crossroads, he reinterated his view that "the struggle of squatters
is the sruggle for land". On the court case, he related how Mandela
refused to recognise the legitimacy of the South African courts at
his trial. He concluded be saying that all that squatters have is
the power to organise and that "there is no easy walk to freedom".
The Kamesh Rd squatters, he suggested, should agree to move to
another area in Langa so that the whole of Langa could be saved. The
meeting was very emotional and many, including Made, broke down and
cried. By this stage the Kamesh Rd area committee was meeting on a
daily basis to discuss plans for resisting the removal.
Eventually, this area committee decided at a meeting on the 6th that
the Kamesh Rd squatters would agree to move voluntarily to another
-location in Langa if this would ensure the upgrading of the rest of
Langa. The activists, who had spent literally dozens of hours in
talks with the Kamesh Rd squatters, were elated with this decision.
However, the amabutho leaders and some Kwanobuhle leaders were
opposed to the decision argueing that this in effect meant
recognising the Group Areas Act. They also argued that the "black
man's struggle for the return of his land" must not be reversed for
the sake of compromise.
In the meantime, the LCC and the unionists had decided that a mass
meeting needed to be held to get a general mandate for the Kamesh Rd
compromise. The white caucus agreed to support the LCC appplication
to the magistrate to hold such a meeting. The result was that the
LCC applied for permission to hold a meeting with letters of support
from the KTC, MCI and Uitenhage municipality. Not surprisingly, the
magistrate gave permission for the meeting. The meeting took place
on the 8th in a soccer field in Langa. It lasted most of the day
with speeches from all the major Uitenhage organisations, including
the trade unions. The LCC leaders chaired the meeting.
Two further meetings with the MCI took place in May during which the
various principles and details were discussed. The final meeting was
held on the 11th June where agreement was reached on all the major
points. Because they represent the basis of an agreement arrived at
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democratically through negotiation, compromise and community
participation, they will be quoted in full as they appeared in the
minutes of the meeting:
"The MCI is prepared to recommend and lobby support for the
implementation of the following:
1. Kabah/Langa will indefinitely remain an area zoned for Black
residents. 2. That Kabah/Langa be upgraded and, if necessary,
extended on the Northern side, to accomodate the existing residents
within sound town planning principles. 3. That such upgrading be
planned to accomodate all income groups, which would include, i.a.,
shack dwellers, 4. That any such upgrading programme be undertaken
utilizing the labour of residents presently unemployed, in order to
help alleviate the hardships experienced in the present economic
recession. 5. That the Municipality of Uitenhage obtain the support
of PLANACT for the master plan to upgrade Kabah/Langa, and to
clearly define the future of zone 61 [Kamesh Rd]. 6. It is
understood that if the authorities agree to the above, the squatters
will agree to voluntarily move."
And then in a separate section:
"1. That the Committee accepts on behalf of the Langa squatters, the
MCI's proposals as set out [above], 2. That the squatters are
prepared to voluntarily move to an alternative and acceptable
location within Langa/Kabah. 3. That the committee will, before the
next meeting between the Committee and the MCI, identify such
acceptable locations in Kabah/Langa. 4. That representatives of the
local authorities of Langa and Uitenhage attend the next meeting of
the Committee and the MCI; that they bring with them a plan clearly
defining the boundaries of Langa and Zone 61; that the
representatives of the local authorities, together with the
Committee, under the chairmanship of a representative of the MCI, at
-that meeting find a suitable and acceptable location where the
squatters can be moved without further delay. 5. The meeting
referred to in 4 above is to be held on 15hoo on Friday, June 20, at
the Goodyear Recreation Centre. 6. It was agreed that the members of
the Uitenhage branch of the MCI will be approached by the MCI in
order to ascertain to what extent the squatters can be assisted with
material for shelter when they move to an alternative location."
This deal meant the Langa squatters were being offered much more
than before the court case in March when the offer was the removal
of 9th-4th ave and upgrading of the rest. They were, in fact, being
offered almost all of what they had struggled for from the
beginning.
With this agreement under his belt, Ronny Kruger of VW and the MCI
convinced the Uitenhage Muncipality to allow him to talk to the
Council as a whole. It was this talk that convinced the Mayor to
agree to come to the June 20th meeting to discuss the upgrading
proposals. Largely because of pressure from VW, by the middle of
June all the major interests in the white establishment had accepted
the proposals, i.e. the KTC, Uitenhage municipality, Le Roux, and
the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning. (66) As
far as the community leaders and unionists were concerned, the June
20th meeting accepted the proposals the MCI and LCC had agreed to on
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the 14th. Although the coloured and Indian Management Committees
were not there, the KTC, Uitenhage municipality, LCC, trade
unionists and MCI sat around a table and, with a map of Uitenhage on
the wall, discussed the most suitable areas into which Langa could
be extended.
Heunis visited Port Elizabeth at this stage to hold discussions with
MPs and officials where he expressed support for the retention and
upgrading of Langa (67). This message was communicated at the time
to the MCI (68).
As far as the Task Group was concerned, Scheepers abandoned his
early position that stipulated that his brief was strictly technical
and therefore he could not meet community representatives. Prior to
the June 20th meeting in Uitenhage, Scheepers led a delegation of
Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth MPs (Dawid Le Roux, Sakkie Louw and
Gert Van Der Linde) that met representatives of the UDFfs Eastern
Cape Regional Executive on June 4th. The meeting was held at the
offices of S.A. Bottling and was chaired by Mr. P. Gutsche, an S.A.
Bottling director. Also present were representatives of the Eastern
Cape Chamber of Commerce, the Eastern Cape branch of NAFCOC.
Scheepers defined the purpose of the meeting as being the need to
discuss the future upgrading of infrastructure in the Port Elizabeth
- Uitenhage region in terms of the Rive Plan guidelines for the
Eastern Cape. Scheepers pointed out that government had allocated
R200 million rand for this purpose. The UDF delegates, who were all
from civic organisations, emphasised their commitment to
non-violent solutions and the need for joint negotiation over the
upgrading and development of infrastructure.
The meeting ended with agreement that further meetings were
essential and the next meeting was scheduled for 23rd June, three
days after the Uitenhage meeting and, in the event, eleven days
-after the State of Emergency was declared. By this stage, all the
community leaders at the meeting were in detention.
To all intents and purposes, therefore, the struggle for Langa had
been won. Through grassroots organisation, mass struggle,
negotiation, compromise and the building of alliances, Langa forced
multi-national capital, the local state and sections of the central
state apparatus to agree on concessions that favoured the majority
of Langa's residents. In addition, the function of Scheepers1 Task
Force changed towards the end when agreement was reached with the
UDF regional leadership that planning would take place within the
context of genuine negotiations.
In the end, however, these gains were reversed. The unique and
fragile balance of forces that made possible mass organisation in
the township, divisions in the white power bloc and negotiations
over realisable concessions, changed fundamentally when the
declaration of the State of Emergency imposed an external dynamic
that subsumed by its shear force all other local dynamics. Working
closely with the SADF and SAP, Le Roux and Erasmus reneged on their
commitment to negotiation and used their newly trained "greenbeans"
(municipal police) to engineer one of the most sophisticated and
precision timed forced removals in recent years. They succeeded
because the security forces had the necessary powers to forcibly
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change the rules of the game and alter the balance of forces in a
way the social movement could do nothing about. Capital did little
to stop the process and the LCC leaders were detained. In short, the
State of Emergency re-united the power bloc of dominant white class
interests and destroyed the social movement that represented the
popular classes.
PEOPLE'S POWER OR DUAL POWER?
Once community organisations have, in effect, taken "political and
ideological" control of a township, they do not have coercive
control. They therefore have a choice. They can take on the state
and risk a full-frontal confrontation, or reach a temporary
accomodation with the state. The former option would have
involved turning the townships into "liberated zones".
However, in the absence of a permanent "people's army" to defend
these zones along lines seen in northern Mozambique during the
anti-colonial war, the communities had no chance of winning a
confrontation. The result would have been the immediate
decimation of their organisations. This is why its a misnoma to
refer to the process as the birth of "rudimentary organs of people's
power" (69)
The alternative, therefore, lay in demanding recognition as
the representative of the community. This is a classic pattern
of power distribution during times of intense conflict and
struggle. It goes back to the Paris Commune in 1848, the
Soviets in Russia in 1917, Barcelona1s communes during the
Spanish Civil War, and the US ghetto revolts of the 1960s (which
-is where the notion of "ungovernability" was first used). It is a
situation that Lenin referred to as "dual power" because like the
relationship between the Provisional Government and the Soviets
before October 1917, the existing duly constituted state agrees
to recognise a rival source of power. This arrangement is usually
transitional and will only culminate in a revolution if the
security forces cease backing the state (like in Russia).
However, in cases where the security forces remain loyal but are
not used to totally smash the alternative power structures, "dual
power" can lead to negotiation and greater democratisation as the
rival points of power are absorbed on terms more favourable
for the popular classes. This is what happened to the US
ghettoes, the South American squatter movements, the Spanish
Citizens Movement during the 1970s, the Phillipino protest
movements after Marcos, Solidarity in Poland, Mau Mau in
Kenya, the guerillas in Zimbabwe and many similar examples.
The implications of this process for the South African context
are far-reaching to say the least. It boils down to the fact that
movements can only be revolutionary when they operate under
revolutionary conditions. Although social movements like the
one discussed in this paper were smashed despite their desire to
negotiate, a less repressive and a more democratic
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